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Ukraine is disintegrating before our eyes, with escalating anarchy, civil war and proxy war 
with Russia, and dozens killed in Odessa last Friday. Acting President Alexander Turchinov 
officially declared that Kyiv is powerless to resume control of Donetsk and Lugansk, but 
then the day after launched a major assault on Slaviansk. The Geneva Quad agreement of 17 
April is ignored. The viability of the presidential election scheduled for 25 May is threatened 
by boycotts in the east. 
With the political dynamics out of control, political leaders have now together to decide how 
to stop this insanity of Ukrainians killing each other. The Geneva agreement had promising 
content and, crucially, quadripartite support. It has now to be built upon, but this time with 
decisive effectiveness. Even if Russia is to be criticised, it will not be crippled by the 
sanctions, certainly not in the short-run, and meanwhile the growing anarchy and violence in 
the eastern regions brings increasing calls for Russian protection, i.e. a ‘peacekeeping’ 
invasion. 
The EU should call immediately for a second Geneva meeting of the Quad. This time the 
agenda should be decisive reinforcement of the OSCE mission, or its replacement by a new 
tripartite peace and order enforcement mission, but in either case led jointly by Ukrainian, 
European and Russian uniformed and flagged troops and police. Each armoured personnel 
carrier, whether Ukrainian, Russian, or European, should carry three large flags.   
Recall Berlin 1945, with the patrol jeeps manned by that quad, of British, French, Soviet and 
US troops, for a little inspiration while of course not a model.  
This tripartite operation would represent a huge act of political choice and reconciliation to 
change course, from one of virtual war between Ukraine and Russia, and of overt political 
confrontation between Russia and the EU over their common neighbourhood. Given the 
divided loyalties and identities of Ukraine, this country should have good relations with 
both its neighbours, who should work together constructively to this end.  
The operation can be simply described. First dismantle and clean up the Maidan in Kyiv. It 
would suffice there for just a few armoured personnel carriers, crucially carrying three big 
Ukrainian, EU and Russian flags to move in alongside a bulldozer and with trucks to carry 
away the debris.   
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Then move on into eastern Ukraine, especially Donetsk and Lugansk, which will require 
much Larger contingents, but the same formula. Kyiv would end its military operations. 
Light military vehicles, jointly manned and flagged with Ukrainians, Europeans and 
Russians, would escort bulldozers to demolish road blocks and barricades, and demand 
evacuation of the public buildings. While Donetsk and Lugansk will be the toughest part of 
the operation, the other eastern regions, from Kharkiv to Odessa, should see lighter patrol 
and stand-by contingents to prevent further contagion of the violence. The deployment of 
the triple-flagged contingents should be preceded by a massive information campaign from 
the leaderships of all Quad parties to explain that together they had resolved to go for this 
peaceful, strategic solution.     
For the EU this would be a regular but vital ESDP mission. The resources required are 
available. There is no lack of European military or policing capabilities for this kind of 
operation, and thanks to the EU’s enlargement ten years ago, no shortage nowadays of 
Russian-speaking EU peacekeepers. For Russia this is the only way a temporary military 
presence in Ukraine could avoid the stigma of invasion. The failing Ukraine state would be 
rescued by the huge political symbolism and reality of the three flags working together. 
While the Quad would sponsor this reinforced operation, neither US nor NATO presence in 
the joint operation is necessary technically nor plausible politically. The proving of the 
tripartite operation would be grounds for suspension of the US as well as European 
sanctions against Russia.   
Should the new tripartite brigade be authorised to use lethal force if there is resistance? 
Better not get into who would give the orders to fire. If there were refusal to cooperate and a 
stand-off the matter should be taken to the highest political level, for Russia with the EU and 
Ukraine  together to order evacuation of the buildings explicitly both on the spot and with 
leaders taking their case to the TV channels. If there is still no cooperation the Quad would 
concert together on further steps.   
This tripartite process should also lead on to further political understandings. The May 25 
presidential election would go ahead correctly in the whole of Ukraine, but could be 
accompanied by referendums is some eastern regions with the question:  
Would you prefer for your region to remain part of Ukraine alongside a process of 
constitutional reform to guarantee adequate regional safeguards on matters of 
languages and decentralised competences; or would you prefer separating from 
Ukraine and joining Russia? 
Opinion polls consistently say that simple majorities would support the first alternative, 
even in Donetsk. 
If the new post-May 25 authorities in Kyiv wish to go ahead and sign the DCFTA with the 
EU, there should be completion of the process initiated at the June 2013 EU-Russia summit to 
examine any possible unintended harmful consequences of the DCFTA for Ukraine-Russian 
economic relations.  
The EU should now make such proposals with the utmost urgency. The US would be glad to 
see the EU, whose flags have been flying in Kyiv like the Russian ones in Donetsk, take up its 
responsibilities. Russia has already advocated trilateral solutions. The chances are that the 
overwhelming majority of Ukrainians would be mightily relieved. This short-term action 
should also have long-term strategic consequences for the European order, if it initiated a 
switch by the EU and Russia into cooperative mode over their common neighbourhood. 
 
